Temporary contracts, as well as labor protection, have been used to reduce unemployment with the latter leading to fewer job destructions. This paper estimates a search and matching model with labor protection and dual labor markets in which the use of temporary contracts is endogenous. Chilean data is used to evaluate the role of labor protection legislation and the use of temporary contracts in unemployment, welfare, and inequality. Results indicate that both types of contracts survive in equilibrium. Temporary contracts negatively affect the frequency with which regular jobs arrive, offsetting any positive effect of firing costs on unemployment.
Introduction
Temporary contracts are widely used in European countries, and in the last twenty years, have proliferated in developing nations, particularly in Latin American countries (Harrison and Leamer, 1997; Heckman and Pages, 2000) . They have been used to introduce flexibility in the labor market in order to reduce unemployment. However, the literature has found an ambiguous effect of temporary contracts on unemployment because these contracts not only affect the flows out of unemployment but also the flows out of employment for newly hired workers (see for example, Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Güell, 2003; Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego, 2009, among others) . At the same time, labor protection, in the form of firing costs, has also been extensively used to reduce unemployment with the difference that this policy leads to fewer job destructions. The literature has also found that labor protection affects the job creation rate generating an ambiguous effect on unemployment (see for example, Pissarides, 1994, 1999b , among others) 1 .
A large part of the literature that analyzes both temporary contracts and labor protection policies has treated the use of temporary contracts as exogenous. Little attention has been given to the endogenous relation between the two policies. In this line of the literature, the closest paper to this research is Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) . However, data for some OECD and Latin American countries suggest that temporary contracts are actually used to reintroduce some flexibility when firing costs are high. In a way, this implies that employers try to avoid firing restrictions by replacing permanent with temporary workers (Harrison and Leamer, 1997) . This idea is captured in Figure 1 where there is a positive relation between the degree of protection of permanent jobs and the share of temporary contracts 2 . Hence, the following question arises: Once the government authorizes the use of temporary contracts, are these contracts an equilibrium response of firms to introduce flexibility when firing costs are high? An interest in this endogenous relation has emerged only recently, and the related literature is still scarce (see Cao et al., 2011; Alvarez and Veracierto, 2012; Macho-Stadler et al., 2011; Paolini and de Tena, 2012) .
In addition to the policy implications of temporary contracts, there are concerns regarding the use of these contracts in Latin American countries since they represent a phenomenon of job inse-1 There is an exception that occurs in the absence of perfect insurance markets where employment protection (chosen optimally) plays a role of insurance and the job creation rate is not affected (Pissarides, 2001) .
2 The degree of protection is captured by the index constructed by Pierre and Scarpetta (2004) .
curity (like informality) and can potentially have important effects on productivity and growth. In particular, they are associated with lower investment in human capital and productivity losses because the lack of attachment to the firm reduces the incentive of firms to invest in workers (Heckman and Pages, 2000) . Empirically, Carpio et al. (2011) , in their analysis of the Chilean labor market, find that having a temporary contract reduces the probability of receiving employer-paid training. Dolado and Stucchi (2008) also find, for the case of Spain, evidence of an impact of temporary jobs on total productivity; however, their mechanism is different. In their case, temporary contracts reduce the effort of workers if the probability of becoming a permanent worker is low. Therefore, following this line of the literature, temporary contracts generate a trade off between flexibility and productivity gains.
This paper tries to answer the following questions: Can temporary contracts emerge in equilibrium when firing costs exist in a model with search frictions? Given the trade off between flexibility and productivity, do firms find it more attractive to hire on a contingent basis? In dual labor markets (that is, with permanent and temporary contracts), are agents better off and labor market outcomes less unequal? In an effort to answer these questions, this paper extends the work presented in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , and proposes a search and matching model with dual labor markets, in which the use of both temporary and permanent contracts is endogenously determined as part of the equilibrium. 3 Furthermore, the proposed model includes firing costs in the form of severance taxes to analyze the effect of labor protection policy on the equilibrium share of both types of contracts. Finally, to capture the trade off between flexibility and productivity, the model includes, in a very simple way, a mechanism of productivity gains only for permanent jobs.
The model is then structurally estimated using likelihood methods with supply side data on the Chilean labor market. To quantitatively evaluate the role of labor protection legislation and the use of temporary contracts in unemployment, welfare and inequality, the paper presents counterfactual exercises.
There are at least four reasons for working with Chilean data. First, Chile is one of the developing countries in which there was an important proliferation of contingent work arrangements in the 1990s 4 , and that period also coincides with an increase in firing costs. Second, aside from Brazil, Chile is one of the countries with the highest and more persistent levels of income inequality, not only at the regional level but also worldwide. Third, the level of informality in the Chilean labor market is one of the lowest for Latin American standards -less than 20% of employment is in the informal sector (Puentes and Contreras, 2009 ). Finally, for estimation purposes it is necessary to have information on labor market transitions, and the Chilean Social Protection Survey used in this paper is the only known longitudinal data for a Latin American country.
The model departs from the existing literature in two main aspects. First, this paper does not apply the commonly used definition of temporary contracts in the literature, which links this type of contract with fixed-term contracts. Instead, the analysis uses a more broad definition of temporary contracts. In particular, these contracts have a predefined duration (possibly more than 12 months),
are not subject to firing costs, and are not necessarily converted to a permanent one at the end of the contract. This distinction is relevant for Latin American countries where a large proportion of the labor force is involved in agriculture and other primary activities making fixed-term contracts less relevant than per-service or seasonal jobs 5 . Second, it is assumed that there are two types of jobs in the market, permanent and temporary. Therefore, a productivity (and wage) distribution is associated with each type of job. This implies that some jobs are done by workers hired under a permanent contract and others are done by workers hired on a temporary basis. This assumption allows for the fitting of overlapped wage distributions, similar to the ones found in the Chilean labor market 6 . Indeed, as Kalleberg (2000) suggests, temporary workers earn, on average, lower wages, 4 Descriptive evidence on the importance of these types of contracts in the Chilean labor market can be found in a cross-section household survey, which is representative at the national level, called the Socio-Economic Characterization Survey (CASEN). The main facts that arise from this data are: (1) temporary contracts are important even for skilled workers (they represent 35% of all jobs), (2) temporary contracts are important regardless of worker age (the share of these contracts is roughly constant across age groups), (3) temporary contracts last on average less than permanent contracts but more than 12 months (over 100 months for permanent contracts vs. close to 40 months for temporary contracts), (4) workers with permanent contracts earn more on average (almost 60% more), but there are also workers with temporary contracts earning high wages, (5) temporary contracts have higher prevalence in some sectors, particularly among the unskilled workers (like construction, agriculture and mining). 5 For example, in the case of the Chilean labor market, fixed-term contracts represent only 13% of temporary contracts, and in the case of the Mexican labor market, the proportion of fixed-term contracts is even lower, 9.3%. 6 However, if it is assumed that there is one productivity distribution and the firm chooses the type of contract after observing the productivity, as in Cao et al. (2011) , permanent workers will always have higher productivities (and but because there is considerable heterogeneity in the wages for temporary workers, it is possible to find jobs in which temporary worker earnings are higher than those of regular employees.
Finally, in the estimation process there are observed heterogeneity controls because there is evidence that the wage gap between temporary and permanent jobs depend on education and gender (Felgueroso and De la Rica Goiricelaya, 1999) . In particular, the sample used in this paper is comprised of males who are unskilled (without a college degree), since the higher wage gaps are usually found in the bottom of the distribution (Bosio, 2009 ).
The results obtained show that given the estimated parameters, both temporary and permanent contracts survive in equilibrium and that temporary contracts are used by firms to reintroduce flexibility when there is an increase in firing costs. There is a strong substitution effect between contracts. However, temporary contracts negatively affect the frequency with which regular jobs arrive, offsetting any positive effect of firing costs on unemployment, and generating persistent inequality. Finally, temporary contracts increase flexibility but do not make workers and firms better off (there are important productivity gains in regular jobs). Welfare gains from temporary contracts are observed only if labor protection is very stringent. This is a steady-state result and does not take into account any cushion effect on business cycles.
The paper is organized in the following manner: Section 2 presents the search and matching model and defines its steady-state equilibrium. Section 3 describes the data used in the estimations and the procedure followed to obtain the estimation sample. Section 4 presents the estimation method, discusses the identification strategy, and reports the estimation results. Section 5 contains the counterfactual and policy experiments, and, finally, Section 6 concludes.
The Model
This section describes the model setup and the determination of the steady state equilibrium. The model used in this paper is an extension of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , which considers both temporary and permanent contracts that are endogenously determined as part of the equilibrium 7 .
wages) than temporary workers. As a result, it is not possible to have overlapping wages (that is, workers earning more in temporary jobs than in permanent ones). 7 The model in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , aside from being the standard tool in the literature for labor market policy analysis (Albrecht et al., 2009) , studies the interaction between labor market protection and endogenous job
This model assumes that time is continuous and that the economy is populated by infinitely lived workers, who are risk neutral and ex-ante homogenous. There is also a continuum of firms that produce their output with a fixed-coefficient technology using only labor as input. In addition, it is assumed that the labor market environment is stationary and that the search process is random.
Search frictions are characterized by a matching function, which depends on the overall market tightness and the proportion of available vacancies in each type of contract. The model further assumes that there are two invariant worker-firm productivity distributions: one for each type of contract 8 . Once a firm meets a worker, a match-specific productivity, conditional on the type of contract, is drawn from the relevant productivity distribution, previously mentioned, and wages are determined by Nash bargaining. Only unemployed workers search for jobs, that is, there is no on-the-job search in the model.
The main differences between permanent and temporary contracts are due to employment protection legislation and productivity gains. Permanent contracts are related to regular jobs, for which there is no specified term in the contract and there is job protection in the form of firing costs. Additionally, workers with permanent contracts are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, which can be positive or negative. Positive shocks are interpreted as productivity gains 9 , while negative shocks can lead to a destruction of the worker-firm match, implying that permanent contracts are subject to endogenous job destruction.
On the other hand, this paper departs from the widely used definition of temporary contracts in the literature, in which these contracts are considered to have a fixed-term characteristic (see for example, Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002; Cao et al., 2011) 10 . Instead, this paper (following the discussion from the previous section) follows Wasmer (1999) , which presents a more general definition of temporary contracts. More specifically, these contracts are defined-duration contracts with contract-specific durations. This implies that these contracts can last a finite number of periods (possibly more than one) and two contracts can differ in their durations. Temporary contracts can be terminated, at no cost, either because the maximum duration expires or by a destruction shock; both destruction, which is particularly relevant for the analysis in this paper. 8 This assumption allows for the fitting of cases in which productivities overlap across contracts. 9 In particular, these productivity gains can be interpreted as human capital investments, which exist in this type of contract given the incentives provided by a permanent contractual relation (Heckman and Pages, 2000) . 10 In a fixed-term contract, as defined in the literature, the job lasts for one period and can be converted to a permanent contract upon its expiration date, at no cost.
cases are treated as an exogenous termination. Finally, it is assumed that firms do not transform this type of contract into a permanent contract.
The introduction of firing costs, in the form of severance tax payments, has important implications on wage determination, since firing costs change the threat point in the Nash bargaining game.
In particular, if a firm with a permanent contract meets a worker, then they bilaterally bargain the wage; and if the job is not created (due to a bad productivity draw) then both the worker and the firm continue the searching process without any severance tax payment. On the other hand, if a worker is currently employed with a permanent contract and he receives a productivity shock, then the worker and the firm engage in a wage renegotiation process. However, in this case the firm has to pay the severance tax if the job is destroyed; therefore, the bargaining position of the worker is better (the outside option of the firm is different in both cases). Following the same terminology as in Pissarides (2000), a newly hired worker is called an outsider worker, while a continuing employee is called an insider worker. Additionally, payroll taxes exist on both sides of the market. As in Albrecht et al. (2009) , and to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the collected taxes, both payroll and severance, are not redistributed among workers and are just thrown into the ocean.
It is important to mention that the distinction between the two types of contracts is related to the degree of flexibility and not to the degree of formality (or informality) of the labor market. Both types of contracts are related to formal jobs.
Workers's Value Functions
At any point in time, workers can be in any one of the following four states: unemployed, employed as a new hire with a permanent contract (indexed by OP , outsider permanent), a continuing employee with a permanent contract (indexed by IP , insider permanent), and employed as a new hire with a temporary contract (indexed by T ). Let u be the rate of unemployment, and v P and v T be the job vacancy rates with permanent and temporary contracts, respectively. Therefore, the total vacancy rate is v = v P + v T . If the population is normalized to 1, then the rates at which workers and firms potentially match are m(u, v P ) and m(u, v T ), respectively; m(·) is the matching function, which is increasing in both arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree one. Defining the overall labor market tightness as q = v P +v T u and the proportion of permanent contract vacancies with respect to the total number of vacancies as η = v P v P +v T , and using the homogeneity property of the matching function, it is possible to write the rates at which unemployed workers meet job vacancies with permanent and temporary contracts as
respectively 11 . It is assumed that only unemployed workers search for a job (there is no on-the-job search).
When a worker meets a vacancy, there is a match-specific productivity. Let F i (x) be the invariant worker-firm productivity distribution, for i = P, T , from which the productivity x is drawn.
Not all meetings create a job because not all workers draw a high enough productivity to make the match worthwhile. Only draws higher than the reservation productivity of new hires under permanent contracts (x * OP ) or higher than the reservation productivity under temporary contracts (x * T ) end up with a job creation for each type of contract. Let U be the value of unemployment, W OP (x) be the value of employment for a new hire under a permanent contract, and W T (x) be the value of employment for a worker hired under a temporary contract. Therefore, the flow value of unemployment is expressed as:
While unemployed, individuals receive a utility (or disutility) b interpreted as the flow income, which is equivalent to the value of leisure. At rate α P w , a worker meets a vacancy with a permanent contract, and if a job is created there is a capital gain of W OP (x) − U . Similarly, a worker meets a vacancy with a temporary contract, at rate α T w , and when the job opportunity is taken there is a capital gain of W T (x) − U .
In order to write the flow value of employment under a permanent contract, and according to the previous discussion about the effect of firing costs on wages, it is necessary to distinguish between a new hire (outsider) and a continuing employee (insider), both under permanent contracts. Let W IP (x) and x * IP be the value of employment and the reservation productivity for a continuing employee under a permanent contract, respectively. The flow value of an outsider worker with a permanent contract and current productivity x can then be written as:
11 In an analogous way, the rates at which vacancies meet workers for both types of contracts can be stated as: while the flow value of an insider worker with a permanent contract can be expressed as:
An outsider worker with a permanent contract in a job with productivity x receives an after payroll tax wage rate of w OP (x) (1 − τ P ). A productivity shock arrives at a Poisson rate λ P . If the new productivity x is above the reservation productivity x * IP , then the worker remains employed, but he is now an insider worker with a capital gain or loss of
There is the possibility of productivity gains if x > x. On the contrary, if the new productivity is below the reservation productivity, then the worker becomes unemployed and the capital loss is U − W OP (x).
If an insider worker with a permanent contract continues as an employee, then he receives an afterpayroll-tax wage rate of w IP (x) (1 − τ P ) and a capital gain or loss of W IP (x ) − W IP (x); but if the job is terminated, then the capital loss for the worker is U − W IP (x).
When a worker is employed with a temporary contract the flow value is:
In this case, a worker with a temporary contract and productivity x, receives an after-payroll-tax wage rate of w T (x) (1 − τ T ). He loses his job at a Poisson rate λ T with a consequent capital loss of U − W T (x). Note that this reflects the fact that temporary contracts are not converted into permanent contracts upon their expiration dates.
Firms' Value Functions
J OP (x) and J IP (x) are defined as the values of a filled job for a new hire (outsider) and a continuing employee (insider), both under permanent contracts, respectively. Similarly, J T (x) is defined as the value of a filled job under a temporary contract. Also, let V P and V T be the values of creating a vacancy for each type of contract, permanent and temporary, respectively. Using these definitions the flow values of a filled job under a permanent contract can be written as:
and
Firms using permanent contracts receive a flow output of x and pay an after payroll tax wage rate of w OP (x)(1 + φ P ) if a worker is an outsider, and w IP (x)(1 + φ P ) if he is an insider. In this setup, both the employer and the employee pay payroll taxes, making it possible to differentiate the source of the tax payment. There are two possible outcomes when there is a productivity shock.
First, for any productivity greater than the reservation productivity the firm continues producing and the capital gains or losses are J IP (x ) − J OP (x) and J IP (x ) − J IP (x) for an outsider and an insider worker, respectively. Second, if the shock is sufficiently bad, that is, the new productivity has fallen below the reservation productivity, then the worker is dismissed and the firm has to pay the severance tax (Ψ). In this case, the capital loss, V P − J i (x) − Ψ for i = IP, OP , takes into account that the firm now has an unfilled vacancy and has to pay the severance tax.
In turn, the flow value of a filled job under a temporary contract is:
Firms using temporary contracts receive a flow output of x and pay an after payroll tax wage rate of w T (x)(1 + φ T ). It is assumed that the payroll taxes differ with the types of contracts. When there is a termination shock the match is destroyed at no cost, generating a capital loss of
to the firm. Thus, both the worker and the firm once again engage in the search process.
Finally, the flow values of unfilled vacancies for both types of contracts are:
For firms to keep the vacancies while searching, they pay a per-period fixed cost of k P and k T , according to the type of contract, permanent and temporary, respectively. At rate α P e = α P w ηq , firms with a permanent contract job meet workers, and if the realized match-specific productivity is good enough (greater than the reservation productivity x * OP of a new hire with this type of contract), then the vacancy is filled and the firms have a capital gain of J OP (x) − V P . In the case of firms with a temporary contract job, meetings occur at rate α T e = α T w (1−η)q and the capital gain for the firms is J T (x) − V T if the job is created.
Steady-State Equilibrium
The steady-state condition requires that both: (1) the flow out of unemployment into jobs with permanent contracts is equal to the flow into unemployment from permanent contract jobs:
and (2) the flow out of unemployment into jobs with temporary contracts is equal to the reverse flow:
Combining the last two equations and using the fact that e P + e T + u = 1 makes it possible to find expressions for the unemployment rate (the Beveridge curve) and the employment rates in temporary and permanent contract jobs:
The next step in finding the equilibrium is defining how wages are determined. Since workers and employers meet on a bilateral basis, wages are determined in a bargaining process between both parties once the match-specific productivity is realized. As is a common practice in the literature, the generalized axiomatic Nash bilateral bargaining outcome is used to determine wages (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999a) . If β P and β T are the worker's relative bargaining power parameters when he faces an employer offering a permanent and a temporary contract, respectively, the different wage rates solve the following optimization problems (according to the type of contract and if the worker is an outsider or an insider) 12 :
From the worker's point of view, the threat point is simply the value of breaking the contract, which is the value of unemployment. From the firm's point of view, the threat point is the value of continued search, and it differs depending on the type of contract and whether the worker is an outsider or an insider. If an unemployed worker meets a firm with a permanent contract (the worker becomes a new hire or an outsider if the job is formed), then the threat point in the bargaining process is the value of an unfilled vacancy (V P ) since the firm does not have to pay the severance tax if the worker is not hired. On the other hand, if a firm is bargaining the wage with a continuing permanent contract employee (an insider), then the threat point is V P − Ψ because if the worker is dismissed the firm ends up with an unfilled vacancy and the obligation to pay the severance tax.
Finally, if an unemployed worker meets a firm with a temporary contract, the threat point is simply the value of an unfilled vacancy for this type of contract (V T ). The total surplus from a match for
is defined as the sum of the values to the firm and the worker net of their values of continued search and payroll taxes. Therefore:
The solutions of the above optimization problems split the total surplus in fixed proportions at all points in time and at all x ≥ x * i for i = OP, IP, T . In each case, the proportions of the total surplus that goes to the workers are:
while the firms obtain:
Using equations (13) and (14) to rewrite the flow values of workers and firms, equations (1) to (7), in terms of the total surplus, and making the appropriate substitutions, it is easy to show that the wage equations are:
These wage equations are very similar to those found by Albrecht et al. (2009) . The only difference is that, in this paper, workers also pay payroll taxes. In all cases, the wage is a weighted average of the match-specific productivity (adjusted by the severance tax in the case of permanent workers) and the worker's continuation value. Since w OP (x) = w IP (x) − β P (λ P +r) (1+φ P ) Ψ and given that (r, λ P , β P , Ψ) are all positive and 0 ≤ φ P ≤ 1, the wage of a continuing employee (insider) with a permanent contract is higher than that earned by a new hire (outsider) with a similar type of contract (that is, w IP (x) > w OP (x)). This reflects the fact that a continuing employee has a better bargaining position with respect to the firm than a new hire because of the severance tax 13 .
Once again, using the workers' and firms' flow values written in terms of the total surpluses it is straightforward to verify that:
13 For a detailed discussion see Pissarides (2000) , chapter 9.
At this point, a discussion on the optimality of the match formation decision rule, which has a reservation value property, is necessary. So far it is assumed that in the model this decision rule is optimal. It is evident from equations (18) and (13), that both the total surplus function and the value of employment are strictly increasing in productivity x. Since the value of unemployment is constant, there is a reservation productivity x * i such that W i (x) = U , for i = OP, IP, T . Moreover, at that productivity the total surplus is zero (S(x * i ) = 0) 14 . Using the flow values for an insider worker with a permanent contract, the wage equation, the total surplus definitions, and the condition S(x * IP ) = 0, it is possible to verify that:
Define T (x * IP ) equal to the left hand side of equation (19). Note that T : R → R and that it is differentiable. The function T (x * IP ) is a contraction on R with respect to the usual metric if there is a real number π ≤ 1 such that the derivative |T (x * IP )| < π for all x * IP ∈ R. Note that In the same way, the flow value of an outsider permanent worker, the wage equation, the definition of total surplus, and the condition S(x * OP ) = 0 can be used to find an expression for the reservation productivity of this type of worker. Additionally, equation (19) can assist in writing the resulting expression as:
Note that x * OP ≥ x * IP , which once again reflects the better bargaining position of the insider worker. Also, since x * IP is uniquely determined, so is x * OP . Finally, the flow values of temporary contracts and the wage equation, together with the definition of the total surplus and the condition S(x * T ) = 0, generate:
14 In the case of the permanent contracts, for which the termination is endogenous, this reservation productivity is also the destruction threshold. 15 Note that the solution is unique given that the value of rU is a function of the endogenous variables q and η (as mentioned in the next subsection)
The reservation productivity for a temporary contract is equal to the flow value of the unemployment state (adjusted for payroll taxes), which is the usual result when the model has exogenous destruction and when there is no severance tax.
To close the model, the free-entry condition in the vacancy creation problem for both types of contracts is used. Profit maximization requires that all rents from new job creations should be exhausted such that the value of one more vacancy is zero, that is V i = 0 for i = OP, T (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) . Applying this condition to equations (8) and (9) and the definitions of total surplus in equation (18), the following equations can be obtained:
which implicitly defines a system of equations in q and η. These last two expressions and the definition of the total surplus can be used to rewrite the flow value of unemployment in equation
(1) in the following way:
A formal definition of the steady-state equilibrium can now be stated 16 :
a vector of taxes (τ P , τ T , φ P , φ T , Ψ), and probability distribution functions for the productivity of permanent and temporary contracts F P (x) and F T (x), a steady-state equilibrium in a dual labor market economy is a labor market tightness q and a proportion of job vacancies with permanent contracts η, together with reservation productivities x * i for i = OP, IP, T , unemployment rate u and employment rates e P and e T such that:
1. Given q and η, and rU from equation (24), the reservation productivities x * i for i = OP, IP, T solve equations (19) to (21).
2. Given the reservation productivities x * i for i = OP, IP, T , the unemployment rate u and employment rates e P and e T satisfy equations (10) to (12).
3. q and η solve the system of equations (22) to (23) and are consistent with the reservation productivities x * i for i = OP, T .
The equilibrium exists if the system of equations (22) to (23) has a solution for q and η in the third part of Definition 1, which in turn depends entirely on the matching function (recall that x * i for i = OP, IP, T is given in this stage). Under the assumptions made for the matching function, particularly the one on its increasing characteristic, there is a solution possibly involving a corner solution in η. If, in addition, it is assumed that the matching function is strictly increasing, then that solution is unique.
Data
To estimate the model, this paper uses microdata on the Chilean labor market, particularly, the The sample size was further reduced due to other problems with the data. First, double censored spells (or very long spells) in the unemployment state cannot be used because they generate an identification problem as discussed in the next section 19 . Fortunately, this type of spell represented only 0.4% of the valid sample, and could be discarded. Second, the sample contained unrealistically high wages. Therefore, to avoid this outlier problem, 2.5 of the upper and lower percentiles in wages were dropped from the sample (resulting in a reduction of 13% of the valid sample observations).
This elimination generated an average wage that is comparable with another Chilean Household Survey 20 . Finally, the unemployment state is characterized only by persons who are looking for a job, because the model does not have data on participation decisions. To control for inconsistencies in the histories with respect to unemployment and inactivity, the survey questions the individuals on their labor market status, as well as whether they were looking for a job if in the last spell they considered themselves as unemployed. Using this data, inconsistencies in terms of unemployment and observations in which persons were not looking for a job were discarded. Finally, individuals with missing information on wages, hours worked or event dates were eliminated from the sample.
These inconsistencies and missing data generates a further decrease of 6% and leaves the estimation sample with a total of 3,600 individuals. encountered when working with self-reported data is the quality of the information, where short lived events tend to be over reported. The problem is exacerbated when the self-reported data is retrospective as is the case in the EPS. However, given its longitudinal dimension, which is central for the identification of the parameters, this paper uses the EPS, even though the CASEN has a bigger sample size and is more accurate (it is self-reported, but not retrospective). 22 The low percent of temporary contracts underestimates the importance of temporary workers when compared with that of the 2006 CASEN survey (Table 1) .
the worker (Edwards and Edwards, 2000) . On the other hand, the unemployment insurance contribution depends on who pays the tax. In particular, workers hired under permanent contracts pay 0.6% of their wages to the unemployment insurance, while employers contribute 1.6% towards this insurance. If a worker is hired under a temporary contract, only the employer contributes 3% of the wages towards unemployment insurance (Fajnzylber et al., 2009 ).
Finally, the EPS survey contains information on the reasons for job termination and whether a severance payment occurred or not. Therefore, in principle it is possible to calculate the severance payment. However, since information on wages and duration are required 23 , and durations are likely to be (left-) censored, the average firing cost is going to be underestimated. 
Estimation
The model is estimated by maximum log-likelihood method using supply side information of the labor market, that is, durations in different labor market states and wages under temporary and permanent contracts. While this information, as pointed out by Flinn (2006) , is useful in learning about arrival and termination rates, and the parameters that characterize the productivity distribution, it is not useful in characterizing the vacancy creation problem. Hence, the lack of demand side information is clearly a limitation. Since the market tightness (q) and the proportion of vacancies with permanent contracts (η) affect only the arrival rates α P w and α T w , it is possible to estimate them as parameters, after which q and η can be recovered by relying on other sources of information or by making specific assumptions regarding the matching function. Consequently, the vacancy cost parameters can also be estimated. This is one of the alternative identification strategies proposed by Flinn (2006) to estimate search and matching models with endogenous arrival rates only with supply side information. The identification of arrival and termination rates and productivity distribution parameters relies on Flinn and Heckman (1982) , and since the model differentiates between insider and outsider permanent workers, a feature that is unobserved in the data, the estimation also relies on Flabbi (2010) strategy to identify a mixture of distributions.
The likelihood Function
The data consists of unemployment durations, hourly wages and durations in jobs with temporary and permanent contracts, and transitions from unemployment to both types of jobs, that is:
To find the unemployment duration contribution to the likelihood function, the hazard rate out of unemployment is defined as:
In other words, the hazard rate is defined as the probability that a job is created once a worker meets an employer with any type of contract (reflected as a productivity drawn from the match greater than the reservation productivity). The hazard rate, conditional on the model, is constant.
This implies that the contribution of the unemployment duration is the density of a negative exponential random variable with a coefficient equal to the hazard rate (Flabbi, 2010) . Given that the unemployment duration is observed only for workers who are currently unemployed, the contribution of unemployment duration has to be weighted by the probability of being unemployed (the unemployment rate):
Using the idea of multiple-exit duration models of Bover and Gómez (2004) , it is possible to distinguish between exits from unemployment to a permanent job and to a temporary job. Let the indicator variables of exit to permanent and temporary employments be denoted by D P = I(u → e P ) and D T = I(u → e T ), respectively. Then, it is possible to define the following hazard rates:
such that the hazard rate out of unemployment is h u = h P u + h T u . Therefore, the contribution of unemployment duration to the likelihood function becomes:
There are three features of the data that need to be considered in order to derive the contribution of wages to the likelihood function. First of all, wages are observed in the data, but productivity is not. Secondly, observed wages are accepted wages. Finally, this information is available only for currently employed workers. Therefore, and following Flabbi (2010) , the first step in finding the wages contribution is to map the unconditional wage cumulative distribution from the unconditional productivity cumulative distribution, and construct the truncated version of the density of the former distribution taking into account the optimal decisions of the agent in the model (that is, the wage equations and reservation productivities). The second step is to find the corresponding wage density and weight it by the probability of being employed (the employment rate). The wages contribution to the likelihood function, conditional on being a newly hired worker (outsider) with a permanent contract, is 25 :
On the other hand, the wages contribution to the likelihood function, conditional on being a continuing employee (insider) with a permanent contract, is:
Equations (27) and (28) are conditioned on observing wages for new hires and for continuing employees, both under permanent contracts. However, information to identify the type of permanent worker is not available in the data. Therefore, one additional step in the construction of the likelihood contribution of wages is necessary for this type of contract. To remove the condition of whether the worker with a permanent contract is an outsider or an insider (considering that w IP (x * IP ) = w OP (x * OP ) = w P (x * P )), the following expression is used:
The probability of being a new hire (outsider) is Pr(OP ), and it depends on the duration of the job since the worker remains an outsider if there are no productivity shocks, but the longer the contract lasts the more likely it is for productivity shocks to arrive. Productivity shocks, conditional on the model, are governed by a Poisson process. Therefore, Pr(OP ) = Pr[receive 0 shocks in t] = exp(−λ P t e P ). Also note that Pr(IP ) = 1 − Pr(OP ). Using these probabilities, the last equation becomes:
which is a mixture of two truncated distributions with a weight equal to the probability of being an outsider worker. The construction of the likelihood contribution of wages, conditional on being a temporary worker, follows the procedure described above and can be written as:
Using the densities in equations (26), (29), and (30), the likelihood function is:
where Θ L is the vector of parameters, t i,u , w i , t i,e P are unemployment duration, wages and employment duration under permanent contracts, respectively, u i = 1 if unemployed and 0 otherwise, and e i,P = 1 if the individual is employed with a permanent contract and 0 otherwise. Note that the employment duration of a job with a permanent contract indirectly contributes to the likelihood function, through the wage contributions, and that employment duration under temporary contracts does not provide useful information to the likelihood.
The reservation productivities are endogenous variables in the model and in order to choose the vector of parameters Θ L , the likelihood in equation (31) has to be maximized subject to the following equilibrium conditions:
Finally, rU is also an endogenous variable in the model, but for estimation purposes it is treated as a constant 26 . Therefore, b, which is the only parameter that does not appear directly in the likelihood, is chosen so that all equilibrium conditions are met as described below.
Identification
The identification strategy has three stages. The first follows Heckman (1982) and Flabbi (2010) and is related to the identification of the parameters in the likelihood function (equation 31), which are the job arrival rates (α P w , α T w ), the productivity and termination shock arrival rates (λ P , λ T ), the reservation productivities (x * OP , x * IP , x * T ), the flow value of unemployment (rU ), and the parameters governing the productivity distributions (F P (x), F T (x)). 27
Following Flinn and Heckman (1982) , a necessary condition for the identification of the parameters in the likelihood function is the recoverability condition of the productivity distribution. Under this condition, the entire wage distribution, and thereby the productivity distribution, should be uniquely recoverable from a truncated distribution with a known truncation point. On the other hand, according to Flabbi (2010) the necessary condition to identify a mixture of two truncated distributions, such as the likelihood contribution of permanent workers, discussed in the previous subsection, is that the productivity distribution belongs to a location-scale family. In this paper, it is assumed that the match-specific productivity in both types of contracts is log-normally distributed with mean µ i x and standard deviation σ i x for i = P, T , that is:
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The log-normal distribution meets the recoverability condition (Eckstein and van den Berg, 2007 ) and belongs to a log location-scale family where µ i x is the location parameter and σ i x is the scale parameter (Flabbi, 2010; Flinn, 2006) .
Given the assumed match-specific productivity distributions, the identification of all the parameters in the likelihood rely on information regarding the transitions from unemployment to both types of jobs, the steady state equilibrium conditions (equations 10 to 12), the equilibrium conditions that determine reservation productivities (equations 19 to 21), the differences between wage distributions of permanent and temporary contract jobs (their location and scale parameters), and the differences between the wage distributions of permanent contract jobs with different tenures (their location and scale parameters). In the case of the Chilean labor market, Figures 2 and 3 show that the differences, by type of contract and by tenure, are important and can be exploited in the estimation.
Two parameters of the model, β and r, are not estimated but are set exogenously. As pointed out by Eckstein and Wolpin (1995) and Flinn (2006) the Nash bargaining coefficient β is difficult to identify without demand side information. This paper does not attempt to identify this parameter, instead it is assumed that β P = β T = β = 0.5. The equal bargaining power assumption between workers with permanent and temporary contracts, β P = β T , can be justified by the non discrimination principle mentioned in Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) ; and β = 0.5, which is the common solution in the applied literature, arises when the discount rate is the same for workers and firms (Binmore et al., 1986; Binmore, 1978) 28 . On the other hand, although r enters the likelihood function directly and not only through rU , it is not possible to identify all other parameters if this parameter is included in the estimation. Therefore, as is frequently done in applied micro-studies, r is also set exogenously (Eckstein and van den Berg, 2007) . In the particular case of Chile, r is defined as 0.0053 29 .
The second stage follows Flinn (2006) and is related to the identification of the demand side parameters, which in the case of this model consists of the matching function, m(·), and the cost of 28 Cited in Flabbi (2010) . 29 This rate represents 6.5% in annualized terms (see, for example, Fuenzalida and Mongrut, 2010) . 30 This matching function can be justified by the presence of coordination failures in the labor market. However, despite its theoretical justification, this matching function generates implausible level and duration of unemployment for which it is, empirically, not a good approximation (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001) . 31 This alternative is attractive because the Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale has had empirical success (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001) . The drawbacks are the lack of micro-foundation of this matching function and the use of external estimates. 32 In the estimation, quarterly observations of the job finding rate and the labor market tightness, for the 1992 -2008 period, was used. The former was calculated using the Chilean National Employment Survey (ENE) and following the methodology proposed by Shimer (2012) . The labor market tightness was calculated using data on unemployed workers (also available in the ENE survey) and the vacancies index published by the Central Bank of Chile. The base model is ft = at +γqt, where ft is the logarithm of the arrival rate, qt is the logarithm of the market tightness, at is the logarithm of the level parameter of the matching function, and γ is the parameter of interest. As in Borowczyk-Martins et al. (2013) it is assumed that the at follows at = µ+εt with εt = Second k P and k T solve:
Finally, once all the above parameters are identified, b can be recovered using the equilibrium condition:
Econometric Issues
Three econometric issues arise in estimating the model: (1) measurement error in wages, (2) censoring in unemployment duration data, and (3) censoring in employment duration data. This subsection explains how each of these issues are dealt with.
Measurement error in wages is incorporated in the estimation procedure for two reasons. First, it is very likely that wages are measured with error since the wage data is self reported and it includes wages from past years 33 . Second, and most important, it is not possible to estimate the reservation productivities using the lowest observed wage in both types of contracts, in the spirit of Flinn and Heckman (1982) , because the mapping between the reservation productivity and the reservation wage, in the case of permanent jobs, depends on other parameters to be estimated (the relations are implied in the equilibrium conditions). This problem is critical because the reservation productivities are the truncation parameters in the accepted wage distributions. Therefore, changing these parameters in the maximization process of the likelihood function changes its support, which violates one of the regularity conditions 34 . A way to avoid this problem is to introduce measurement error. Following Flinn (2002) and Flabbi and Leonardi (2010) , it is assumed that the measurement error is multiplicative:
and log-normally distributed, therefore:
33 As is common in the literature, it is assumed that measurement error is present in wages data but not in duration data (Eckstein and van den Berg, 2007; Flinn, 2006) . 34 See Flinn and Heckman (1982) for a complete discussion.
In order to restrict the number of parameters to estimate, it is assumed that the conditional expectation of the observed wages is equal to the true wages, as is done in Flinn (2002) ; that is, E[w o |w] = w, which implies that E[ε|w] = 1. This assumption together with the log-normality assumption implies that the parameters µ ε and σ ε satisfy σ ε = √ −2µ ε . Therefore, only one parameter of the measurement error distribution has to be estimated.
Given the wage density functions for jobs with permanent and temporary contracts, g(w i , i ∈ E P |w i > w P (x * P ), P ) and g(w i , i ∈ E T |w i > w T (x * T ), T ), respectively, and the error density function m(ε), the implied density functions of observed wages can be written as:
Censoring in unemployment duration data is potentially very problematic because it can generate identification problems and bias the estimated parameters. In particular, if the unemployment spells are double censored, that is right and left censored at the same time, the identification of the parameters in the likelihood estimation is not possible because permanent unemployment can be generated by a different combination of the parameters (Flinn, 2002) . 
while the likelihood contribution of a right censored unemployment spell is:
Taking into account measurement error in wages and censoring in unemployment spells, the likeli-hood function becomes:
which is maximized to choose Θ L , subject to equilibrium constraints:
The last econometric issue is related to the censoring problem in the employment duration data.
In this paper, only employment spells of jobs with permanent contracts are relevant. Recall that employment duration indirectly contributes to the likelihood function through the wage contribution, because it affects the probability of being an outsider (that is, Pr(OP ) = Pr[receive 0 shocks in t] = exp(−λ P t e P )). As previously mentioned, employment duration spells can be left or right censored. Right censored spells do not represent a problem because the probability of receiving a determined number of shocks before time t is what is important in the model; hence, at that time the future is irrelevant. On the other hand, left censored spells do represent a potential problem.
This can be observed by expressing the Pr[receive 0 shocks in t] such that the distinction is made between the observed duration t o e P and the true duration t e P . Since t o e P = t e P − a, where a ≥ 0, then:
Given that exp(−λ P a) ≤ 1 with λ P ≥ 0 and a ≥ 0, it is clear that if a is not taken into account, then the probability of receiving 0 shocks in t is overestimated. In the case of permanent contracts, this affects the weights in the mixture of wage densities, which in turn can potentially lead to a bias problem in the estimation.
The censoring problem in the employment duration data is neglected in the estimation results presented in the next subsection since the probability of receiving zero shocks in t decreases exponentially with employment duration. Hence, the effect of the additional months in the duration of long spells is not important. This is the case in the data used in the estimations, since the left censored spells duration is at least 17 months (and there are less than 2% of these spells). Table 2 reports the estimation results. The first two rows show the job arrival rates for both temporary and permanent jobs. Temporary jobs arrive 16% faster than permanent jobs. In particular, while offers with temporary contracts arrive approximately every four and a half months, offers with permanent contracts do so every five months. Rows five through seven of Table 2 report the estimated reservation productivities for permanent (insider and outsider) and temporary jobs. An insider permanent worker and a firm with a permanent contract are willing to continue with a contractual relation if the productivity is at least 1.15 U.S. dollars per hour, which is 20% less than the productivity required to form a match between an outsider permanent worker and a firm with a permanent contract (1.38 U.S. dollars per hour). This reflects the effect of the firing cost on the bargaining position of an insider worker. When workers going from unemployment to temporary and permanent jobs are compared, results on reservation productivity indicate that workers and firms are less stringent when agreeing on a temporary contract than when forming a permanent contractual agreement. In this case, the difference in the reservation productivity is 21%. Combining job arrival rates and reservation productivities, the estimation results suggest that workers are, on average, unemployed for a total of 13 months (the hazard rate out of unemployment is 0.075). Table   4 reports the predictions of the model for these and other variables.
Estimation Results
The productivity shock arrival rate for permanent jobs, reported in the third row of Table 2, indicates that productivity shocks do not occur very often. Similarly, the termination rate for the temporary jobs, reported in the fourth row of Table 2 , also shows a high persistence. As a result, in both cases the hazard rates out of employment, shown in Table 4 , are low. When comparing these hazard rates with their data counterparts, also shown in Table 4 , it is clear that the shock arrival rate for permanent jobs and the termination rate for temporary jobs are underestimated, as are the correspondent hazard rates out of employment. However, it is important to note that the hazard rates observed in the data are not directly comparable with those of the model because, in the absence of on-the-job search, the interpretation of the employment duration in the model is career duration instead of job duration. Another explanation of these results is directly related with the data. As mentioned in section 3, the data on unemployment and employment duration has a retrospective and self-reported nature and seems to be over reported compared to another household survey. Since the model estimation strategy strongly relies on this duration data to estimate the arrival and the termination rates of jobs, as well as the arrival rate of shocks, an over reported unemployment duration generates high employment duration in order to be consistent with the steady state conditions of the model.
The estimated values for the location and the scale parameters of the log-normal match specific distributions for both types of jobs are shown in the last four rows of Table 2 . These values imply (statistically) similar productivity, on average, for workers in temporary jobs. Also, there is six times more uncertainty at the moment of drawing a productivity from the match specific productivity of a permanent job, than from a match specific productivity of a temporary job. Table 4 reports the predictions for the average productivity and its variance and shows that workers receive wage offers that are, on average, 9% higher when they meet firms with permanent contracts than when they meet firms with temporary ones. Once the job is accepted that difference becomes 60%, on average. Finally, the estimation of all parameters is quite precise when evaluating with the asymptotic standard errors. Table 3 shows the estimated value of the technological parameters (the proportion of permanent vacancies, the market tightness and the flow cost of vacancies in temporary and permanent jobs) and the preference parameter (the flow value of leisure) using both the Cobb-Douglas and the Exponential matching functions. All the results discussed below are conditional on the particular assumptions made about the matching function. First, the proportion of permanent job vacancies in the market is around 45%, regardless of the matching function used. Second, the estimated market tightness differ between matching functions. In particular, the market tightness, along with the unemployment rate in Table 4 , imply that the total vacancy rate of the economy (v P + v T ) is 1.6%
when the Cobb-Douglas function is used, and 2.2% when the Exponential function is used. Third, under the Cobb-Douglas matching function, the flow costs of permanent and temporary jobs are around 33 and 9 U.S. dollars, respectively. Meanwhile, these same flow costs are around 23 and 7 U.S. dollars under the Exponential matching function 35 . In any case, it is clear that maintaining a permanent job vacancy unfilled is substantially (between 3.2 and 3.6 times) more expensive than maintaining a temporary job vacancy unfilled. Finally, the flow disutility of leisure is around 4 U.S.
dollars per hour and it does not depend on which matching function is used to identify it.
To conclude this section, some specification tests that were performed and an assessment of the fit of the model are discussed. The last two rows of the bottom panel of Table 2 report the statistics of two F-tests. The first test corresponds to the null hypothesis that both types of jobs have the same arrival rate, which implies that the proportion of vacancies is 50% for each type of job. This null hypothesis can be rejected at 5% significance level. Using the asymptotic standard error of the arrival rates in Table 2 , the hypothesis that the arrival rate of temporary jobs is equal to zero, implying that only permanent jobs survive, and the hypothesis that the arrival rate of permanent jobs is equal to zero, implying that only temporary jobs survive, can also be tested. The results indicate that both hypotheses are also rejected at 1% significance level. Therefore, in the Chilean labor market both types of vacancies, permanent and temporary, coexist but there is one that dominates. The second test tries to verify if the productivity in each type of job is drawn from the same distribution (given that in both cases log-normality is imposed). Once again, the data does not support the hypothesis (at 1% significance level) that productivities in both types of jobs come from the same distribution. Table 4 reports the predictions of the model and some comparable moments in the data. In terms of fit, the wages predicted by the model are slightly higher than its sample counterparts. On the other hand, model predictions of the unemployment and employment rates are really close to those observed in the data. The hazard rate out of unemployment also fits the data well. However, the model predictions of hazard rates out of employment do not fit the data well as was discussed before.
35 Comparing this result with that found by Flinn (2002) , who estimates a flow vacancy cost of 128 U.S. dollars for the U.S. economy for 1996, suggests that the cost of an unfilled vacancy of a permanent job is substantially lower in the Chilean labor market. However, the difference is not that significant, relative to the average wage (while in the U.S. economy it is 18 times the average wage, in Chile it is 13 times the average wage of a permanent worker).
Counterfactual and Policy Experiments
The counterfactual experiment consists in comparing the benchmark economy, that is, the one characterized by the estimated parameters and in which temporary contracts are allowed, with an economy in which the use of temporary contracts is not allowed by law. In the latter economy, the model is solved assuming η = 1 and using all other estimated parameters (except those related with temporary jobs). The policy experiment consists in analyzing the impact of changes in the firing cost on the two economies previously mentioned by taking into account the equilibrium effects. In particular, the experiment analyzes the effect of changes in the firing cost within a range of zero to twice the benchmark severance tax. In performing the counterfactual and policy experiments, a CobbDouglas matching function is used to solve the model with the estimated elasticity of γ = 0.8255.
In both exercises, it is possible to analyze the effect, under alternative institutional arrangements of more stringent labor protection, on labor market dynamics (that is market tightness, availability of vacancies of both types of jobs, arrival rates, hazard rates out of unemployment and employment, and unemployment and employment rates) and on productivity and wages (reservation productivities, average offered and accepted wages, and inequality between workers with different types of contracts). Table 5 , first row, shows that at any firing cost, the labor market is tighter when temporary contracts are allowed. In particular, when these contracts are allowed, the market tightness is at least 50% higher than the market tightness when they are not allowed. This is explained by the fact that the presence of temporary contracts increases the vacancies available in the market. Analyzing the effect of an increase in the firing cost, the same table shows that the market tightness decreases with the firing cost when temporary contract jobs are not allowed because this cost makes vacancy creations of permanent jobs less attractive. Quantitatively, the effect is not substantial -going from no firing cost to twice the benchmark firing cost leads to a decrease of 1.6% in the market tightness. On the other hand, when temporary contracts are allowed, the effect of the firing cost on the market tightness is the opposite. Indeed, despite the fact that the firing cost makes permanent job vacancy creations less attractive, they make temporary job vacancy creations more attractive and in the end this latter effect dominates the former one. This is observed in the decreasing proportion of permanent job vacancies shown in the second row of Table 5 . Market tightness increases by more than 8%, going from no firing cost to twice the benchmark firing cost and the proportion of permanent vacancies decreases by almost 5 percentage points. Permanent vacancies can disappear if the firing cost is really high (more than 10 times that of the benchmark). This is possible in the model but not plausible in practice.
Labor Market Dynamics
The arrival rates for permanent and temporary jobs, shown in the third and fourth rows of Table   5 , reflect what was discussed above. When temporary jobs are allowed, as the firing cost increases, fewer vacancies for permanent jobs reduce the rate at which they arrive, while more temporary job vacancies accelerate their arrival rate. The reduction in the case of permanent job vacancies is 10.1%
and the increase in the case of temporary job vacancies is 23.4%. When temporary jobs are not allowed, the arrival rate of permanent jobs also slows with firing costs but the size of the effect is much smaller -it only reduces permanent job vacancies by 1.3%. Table 5 , rows five to seven, show the effect of firing costs on the different labor market states, that is, on the unemployment and the employment rates, under both types of contracts and their corresponding durations. The fifth row shows shows that the unemployment rate falls with more stringent employment protection when temporary contracts are not allowed. This indicates that the effect of the firing cost in reducing the job destruction rate dominates the one that discourages employment creations. The hazard rate out of unemployment, shown in the eight row of Table 5 , decreases suggesting that even though there are fewer unemployed workers, those who are unemployed stay in that state longer. However, the impact on the unemployment rate and its duration is quantitatively small -the unemployment rate only falls by 0.3 percentage points, going from zero protection to twice the benchmark firing cost and the workers stay unemployed only half a month longer. When temporary contracts are allowed, the effect of stringent protection on the unemployment rate is attenuated, indicating that the the effect of the flows out of temporary jobs dominate that of the flows out of unemployment into temporary contracts. The positive impact of temporary jobs is that they help to reduce unemployment duration by almost a month when employment protection becomes more stringent.
The sixth row of Table 5 shows that the employment rate in permanent jobs increases slightly (by less than half a percentage point). This is consistent with the decrease in the unemployment rate when temporary contracts are not allowed. However, the fact that the employment rate of permanent jobs falls by 6.2 percentage points when temporary contracts are allowed, implying a substitution between permanent and temporary jobs, is more interesting (recall that the unemployment rate is fairly constant in this scenario). The ninth row of Table 5 shows the hazard rate out of permanent jobs. As expected, more stringent protection in permanent jobs discourages its destruction and this is true regardless of whether the use of temporary contracts is allowed or not. Quantitatively, duration of permanent jobs increases by 6.8 and 10.4% when temporary contracts are allowed and when they are not, respectively. Finally, the seventh row of Table 5 shows that the employment rate in temporary jobs increases by 6 percentage points when the firing cost rises. This is consistent with the substitution effect previously mentioned. This positive relationship between temporary job shares and employment protection corresponds to the model counterpart of Figure 1 . On the other hand, row tenth of Table 5 shows the hazard rate out of temporary jobs, which is constant by construction (the termination rate in the model is exogenous).
Productivity and Wages
Row eleventh of Table 5 shows how the reservation productivity of new hires with permanent contracts (outsiders) changes with the firing cost. Regardless of the existence of temporary contracts, the firing cost discourages new hires by increasing the threshold at which matches are formed. When temporary contracts are not allowed, this reservation productivity increases by less than 0.5% with the firing cost, while when both types of contracts coexist it increases by 4.3%. The existence of temporary contracts exacerbates the negative effect on job creations. Row twelfth of Table 5 shows the reservation productivity of continuing employees with permanent contracts (insiders). In this case, the reservation productivity decreases with the firing cost and the effect is quantitatively important (it falls by more than 30%). This is explained by the fact that more protection generates a higher bargaining advantage for workers, reducing the firms' outside option. Therefore, firms are willing to maintain a larger proportion of their workers even if they become less productive after a shock has occurred. For both, insiders and outsiders, the reservation productivity is always higher when temporary contracts are allowed, indicating that a higher productivity is sustained with permanent jobs when the two types of contracts coexist. Row thirteenth of Table 5 shows the reservation productivity of temporary jobs. The positive effect on unemployment of increasing the firing cost in permanent jobs is that the lower reservation productivity facilitates job creation. The down side is that lower productivity jobs will be created.
Rows fourteenth to sixteenth of Table 5 show the average accepted wages. In the case of permanent jobs, the firing cost affects average accepted wages through three mechanisms. First, they directly affect the total surplus of the match. Second, they have an equilibrium effect on the flow value of unemployment. Third, they have an equilibrium effect on the conditional average productivity through the reservation values. On the other hand, in the case of temporary jobs, average accepted wages are affected by the equilibrium effects on the flow value of unemployment and the reservation productivity. In that Table it is shown that the equilibrium effects of the firing cost on reservation productivities are important. Indeed, they almost offset the direct effect of the firing cost for new hires (the decrease is only between 1.3 and 4.4%) and substantially reduce the average accepted wages for continuing employees (between 10.5 and 14.8%). Row sixteenth shows a fall of 3.1% in average accepted wages for temporary jobs. Hence, the effect on the reservation productivity also contributes to this fall. Finally, accepted wages are higher when temporary jobs are allowed.
This is due to a higher reservation productivity, in the case of average accepted wages.
This subsection concludes with the effect of the firing cost on inequality. In this paper, inequality is defined as the difference in wage rates of permanent and temporary workers. Therefore, in this exercise both types of contracts are allowed. Table 5 , row eighteenth, shows the ratios between the average wage in temporary jobs and the average wage in permanent jobs for new hires and for continuing employees. There are three comments worth mentioning from the analysis of that ratio.
First, inequality is high since the gap between accepted wages for permanent and temporary workers are around 40% (comparing new hires in temporary jobs and continuing employees in permanent jobs, respectively). Second, the pattern of the wage ratios is consistent with the changes in wages given by changes in the firing cost. Finally, although inequality changes with the firing cost, it remains high for the range of firing costs considered in this paper, suggesting that the effect of this policy is limited in this aspect.
Welfare Analysis
Following Flinn (2006) and Flabbi (2010) 
where:
is the average workers' welfare (j = OP, IP, T ) andJ j (τ, φ, Ψ) is the average welfare of firms with filled vacancies (j = OP, IP, T ). Note also that e OP (τ, φ, Ψ) = e P (τ, φ, Ψ) Pr(OP ) and e IP (τ, φ, Ψ) = e P (τ, φ, Ψ)(1 − Pr(OP )). To implement equation (32) it is necessary to define the individual contribution to the Social Welfare function:
dx Equation (32) is then used to evaluate changes in welfare (total, workers' and firms' welfares) when the firing cost changes in the case where temporary contracts are allowed and in the case where they are not allowed. Note that equation (32) is the analog to the criterion used by Hosios (1990) in his labor market efficiency study when two types of jobs exist. Figure 4 shows the ratio between the level of welfare reached when temporary contracts are not allowed and when they are allowed, for each degree of labor protection. Note that for any firing cost below 1.8 the benchmark firing cost the total welfare is greater in an economy without temporary contracts. The second observation that can be made is that the relative welfare decreases when the firing cost increases. When the firing cost is low, the level of welfare is higher in an economy without temporary contracts. In this case what matters is the possibility of productivity gains in permanent contracts. However, when firing costs are rather high, the level of welfare in an economy with both types of contracts increases (reducing the relative welfare) and the degree of flexibility becomes more valuable. Temporary contracts make agents better off only if the firing cost reaches high levels. Finally, the shape of the relative welfare means that stringent labor protection generates important trade offs in terms of productivity gains and flexibility.
Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a search and matching model with the following features: First, it has a dual labor market represented by two types of contracts, permanent and temporary, and the use of both is endogenously determined as part of the equilibrium. Second, labor protection is incorporated in the form of firing costs to analyze its relationship with the equilibrium share of temporary contracts. Finally, it incorporates the possibility of productivity gains in permanent jobs. This model is structurally estimated using likelihood methods for the Chilean labor market. In the estimation procedure only supply side data is used and the identification strategy, particularly for the technological or demand side parameters, is discussed. Finally, counterfactual and policy experiments are performed to quantitatively evaluate the role of labor protection legislation and the use of temporary contracts in unemployment, welfare, and inequality. Two main assumptions that depart from the literature are made. First, it is assumed that there are two types of jobs in the market, permanent and temporary; hence, there is also a productivity (and wage) distribution associated with each type of job. This assumption allows for the fitting of overlapping wage distributions. Second, temporary jobs have a predefined duration (possibly more than 12 months), are not subject to firing costs, and are not necessarily converted into a permanent job at the end of the contract.
The estimation results indicate that both temporary and permanent contracts survive in equilibrium, and 45% of the available vacancies are for permanent contracts. This reflects large differences in vacancy costs (US$33 vs. US$9). In terms of the dynamics of the labor market, the magnitude of the parameters suggests that temporary jobs arrive more frequently than permanent jobs (16% faster) and that workers meeting both types of vacancies draw, on average, similar productivities.
With respect to wages, workers receive wage offers that are, on average, 9% higher when they meet firms with permanent contracts than when they meet firms with temporary ones. Once the job is accepted that difference becomes 60%, on average. Finally, the long run unemployment rate is about 5.2%.
The counterfactual and policy experiments results indicate that when the costs of posting vacancies are different, temporary contracts survive even if there is no firing cost. Then, as the firing cost increases, fewer permanent job vacancies reduce the rate at which they arrive, while more temporary job vacancies accelerate its arrival rate. Temporary jobs magnify the effect of firing costs on permanent job arrival rates. Even though labor protection is useful in reducing unemployment, temporary contracts balance out this effect leaving unemployment practically unchanged. Meanwhile, labor protection increases the (equilibrium) employment rate in jobs with temporary contracts. The effects on employment and unemployment rates discussed above implies that there is a strong substitution effect between both types of jobs. With respect to inequality, the negative effect of firing costs on wages is barely compensated with the existence of temporary contracts. Hence, inequality is persistent. Finally, welfare analysis indicates that temporary contracts generate welfare gains only if labor protection is (implausibly) high.
Some policy implications can be drawn from these results. First, temporary contracts increase flexibility but they do not make agents better off. However, it is important to remember that this is a steady-state result, which does not take into account the cushion effect during business cycles.
Second, limiting the use of temporary contracts (in an extreme case, eliminating them) can increase welfare only if labor protection is not stringent. Therefore, stringent labor protection generates important trade offs between productivity and flexibility. Hence, labor protection levels matter in terms of welfare. 
